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I
INTRODUCTION
Representative government is a principal feature of American democracy.
The prevailing view is that a representative government is one that is responsive
to the views and interests of the people.1 Scholars often define “the people” as a
majority subset of the whole and measure the representativeness of government
in terms of its responsiveness to the interests of the majority of the electorate.2
Supreme Court doctrine has been seen as following this prevailing view by
establishing a “one person, one vote” requirement that is explained as
prioritizing majority rule to the exclusion of other law-of-democracy values.3
But there is an alternative, richer account of representative government and
responsiveness that incorporates additional values beyond simple adherence to
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1. See HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 209 (1967) (“Representing . . .
means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them.”); KENNY J. WHITBY,
THE COLOR OF REPRESENTATION: CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BLACK INTERESTS 5 (1997)
(contending that the main component of substantive representation is policy responsiveness); GuyUriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections on the Interpretive
Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1149 (2002) (“Responsiveness is the linchpin of
democratic governance and the sine qua non of a representative democracy.”). Even the debate
between descriptive and substantive representation is about how to best secure a more responsive
government. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
44–45 (1958) (arguing in favor of inclusion of descriptive members of all classes into the government
because of the danger that the interests of the excluded will be overlooked and “seen with very
different eyes from those of the person whom it directly concerns”); MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE,
TRUST, AND MEMORY: MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THE FAILINGS OF LIBERAL REPRESENTATION
3 (1998) (linking descriptive representation to responsiveness to “the distinctive political interests” of
marginalized groups).
2. See BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF
TRENDS IN AMERICANS’ POLICY PREFERENCES 2 (1992) (describing studies that show that the
government does adequately on this measure of representativeness).
3. See infra text and accompanying note 102.
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majority rule. According to this account, “the people” should also be
understood in a disaggregated sense as individuals—and particularly groups of
individuals—with shared interests and experiences. Since there is no monolithic
majority of people with shared interests, but instead shifting majorities based on
combinations of various minority interests,4 a government is representative if it
is open to the consideration of all interests and preferences existent in society,
with equal consideration serving as the ideal.5 Under this view, responsiveness
cannot be measured simply as the degree to which government policy tracks
majority preferences, but must also take into account the consideration given to
minority group views.
Consideration is a rather amorphous concept, but we define it as the process
by which minority group interests are heard by elected actors in the political
process. It is only on the basis of consideration, and the process of bargaining
and compromise within the political process, that minority interests can evolve
into majoritarian public policy. Lack of consideration of minority group
interests within the political process is problematic because when a particular
minority group’s interests are overlooked—whether it is because one party
takes for granted the group’s support or neither party seeks the group’s support
for fear of alienating median-swing voters—there are systemic democratic
consequences. In particular, to the extent that a group and its interests are
excluded from consideration, the members of the group are less likely to vote or
participate in the democratic process, and, equally important, democratic
government has failed in its principal objective of being representative.
We argue that overlooked Supreme Court doctrine in the area of voting
rights takes heed of this concern and seeks to ensure that the political process
provides fair consideration of minority group interests. In this article we
propose a new paradigm for understanding the Court’s view of the
constitutional and democratic requirements for representative government,
which we term minimum responsiveness.
To understand the minimum responsiveness doctrine properly, it is
necessary to situate it within the Court’s broader jurisprudence on the law of
democracy. Too frequently, it has been assumed that the marginalization of
minority group interests must be addressed via antidiscrimination principles.6
However, by nesting the principles underlying representative government in
antidiscrimination doctrine, its applicability would be limited unnecessarily to
suspect classes. The minimum responsiveness standard instead has a doctrinal
4. See V. O. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 207 (1947) (explaining that given
the differentiation in American society, it is difficult for any single interest group to constitute a
majority and govern and “[a] combination of interests is necessary to win elections and to govern”); see
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
5. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
GILDED AGE 252 (2008) (“One of the most basic principles of democracy is the notion that every
citizen’s preferences should count equally in the realm of politics and government.”).
6. Contra Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1, 44–45 (1976) (placing the cases establishing this standard within the antidiscrimination paradigm).
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home in the Court’s burgeoning jurisprudence on the law of democracy and, as
a result, its applicability is not dependent on the prescriptions of
antidiscrimination doctrine. The requirement that there be a minimum level of
responsiveness is therefore applicable not only to politically marginalized racial
and gender groups, but also to groups such as the poor that fall outside of
antidiscrimination discourse.
We flesh out this new paradigm by offering a case study of the minimum
responsiveness standard and its applicability to the poor. In part II, we argue
that defects in the political process are a source of nonresponsiveness to the
interests of politically marginalized groups. In particular, in the American twoparty competition model, both parties have incentives to appeal to medianswing voters at the expense of marginalized group interests. In part III, we offer
examples of this defect in the political process by describing the divergence in
responsiveness to southern Blacks and the poor by the Democratic Party and
the lack of responsiveness by the Republican Party to these two groups over the
last forty years. We do this both anecdotally, by examining the parties’ support
for major legislation consistent with the interests of these groups, and
empirically, through social-science studies showing changes in responsiveness to
these groups over time. We argue from this evidence that in the current political
context, the poor should be considered a politically excluded group, to which
neither of the political parties is responsive. In part IV, we describe the Court’s
development of a minimum responsiveness standard and argue for the
standard’s applicability to politically excluded groups such as the poor. As part
of this discussion, we show that this standard is appropriately located within the
Court’s law-of-democracy jurisprudence. In part V, we offer brief suggestions
for changes in democratic organizational structures that would provide one or
both of the parties with incentives to become, at the very least, minimally
responsive to the poor.
II
SOURCES OF NONRESPONSIVENESS TO MARGINALIZED GROUP INTERESTS
The sources of nonresponsiveness to marginalized group interests cannot be
understood without reference to political parties.7 Parties are an integral part of
the process of creating representative government. Through their competition
for the support of various groups and interests in order to win elections,8 parties

7. See Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1608 (1999)
(“[T]he central fact of democratic politics . . . is that individual participation can be meaningful only
when mediated through organizational forms,” such as political parties.).
8. This prevailing view of parties is contrary to the classical view held by Edmund Burke, who
conceived of parties as “a body of men united, for promulgating by their joint endeavors the national
interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.” MARC J. HETERINGTON &
WILLIAM J. KEEFE, PARTIES, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA 1 (2007) (quoting EDMUND
BURKE, WORKS, vol. 1, 375 (1897)). Most scholars agree that this does not accurately describe the two
major political parties in the United States. See id. at 2.

ROSS II SMITH

200

5/1/2010 10:33:15 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 72:197

are central to any democratic government because they are the essential
instrument through which varied interests are considered, and thus represented,
in the political process.9 The conventional view is that two-party competition
will result in the inclusion and mobilization of all interests and groups because
every vote is needed to secure a majority and ultimate control of the governing
apparatus.10 Even though one party must lose in any election, the interests of the
losing minority are still represented in the political process by an opposition
that can bargain with the majority and could later emerge as the governing
party.
Consistent with this view is the orthodoxy that lack of political participation
by a politically marginalized group leads to the parties’ lack of responsiveness
to that group’s interests. Since the competitive political market requires that the
two parties compete for all voters in order to put together a majority coalition, a
lack of responsiveness to a particular group by both political parties can occur
only when that group of voters chooses not to participate. V. O. Key famously
expressed this view of nonresponsiveness when he stated, “The blunt truth is
that politicians and officials are under no compulsion to pay much heed to
classes and groups of citizens that do not vote.”11 Within this perspective lies the
argument that there is little that courts and legislatures can do to address
nonresponsiveness to marginalized group interests except remove barriers to
participation such as registration requirements and voter identification laws.12
Paul Frymer has recently challenged the conventional view that party
competition leads to inclusive parties and inclusive government.13 He argues
that the system of two-party competition creates incentives for parties to appeal
to “median, ‘swing’ voters.”14 In order to capture the majority needed to win
elections, he contends, centrist voters are pivotal; therefore, to the extent that
peripheral group interests conflict with those in the center, neither party will

9. See E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 1, 62 (1970) (describing political parties
as the creator of democracy and modern democracy as being “unthinkable save in terms of the parties”
because of their role in securing representative government that considers the interests of a multitude
of people); Carl A. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote—One Vote, One
Value, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 52 (“To mobilize a majority of the votes in an election, each political party
must appeal to a variety of ‘interests’ and a wide spectrum of opinion.”).
10. See, e.g., HETERINGTON & KEEFE, supra note 8, at 39 (2007) (describing the conventional view
of parties as inclusive of all elements in society).
11. KEY, supra note 4, at 527; see also Kenneth L. Karst, Participation and Hope, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1761, 1767 (1998) (“If you don’t participate, you can be pretty sure that public officers aren’t
paying attention to you.”).
12. See FRANCIS FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON’T VOTE 17
(1988) (viewing registration barriers as the biggest impediment to voting); RAYMOND WOLFINGER &
STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 61–62 (1980).
13. PAUL FRYMER, UNEASY ALLIANCES: RACE AND PARTY COMPETITION IN AMERICA 6–7
(1999) (challenging the conventional assumption of parties as inherently inclusive). His argument draws
from the median voter theory famously promulgated by Anthony Downs. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 114–22 (1985).
14. FRYMER, supra note 13, at 8.
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seek to appeal to these interests for fear of losing elections.15 Frymer describes
this dynamic in the context of capture, in which an ideologically peripheral
group (Blacks) that overwhelmingly votes for one party (the Democratic Party)
is taken for granted by that party while it appeals to median voters (moderateto-conservative white voters).16 But “captured” minorities are not the only
groups underserved by a two-party system. Frymer overlooks the fact that this
dynamic also results in exclusion, in which an ideologically peripheral group is
ignored by both parties because of the perceived cost of inclusion in terms of
interest-based conflict with median voters.
This party nonresponsiveness resulting from exclusion ultimately affects
participation by members of politically marginalized groups.17 As E. E.
Schattschneider argued, “[a]bstention reflects the suppression of the options
and alternatives that reflect the needs of the nonparticipants.”18 In other words,
contrary to Key’s account, it is nonresponsiveness that causes lack of
participation; members of groups on the periphery abstain because they
perceive no differences between the parties in terms of responsiveness to their
interests.19
A recent shift in the political science literature on the causes of lack of
political participation seems to provide further support for the view that lack of
responsiveness to marginalized groups’ interests is caused by something more
than lack of participation by members of that particular group. In the 1970s and
1980s, the prevailing view in political science was that resources—particularly
education and to a lesser extent income—were positively correlated with

15. Frymer was not the first political scientist to identify the tendency of parties to appeal to the
center at the exclusion of the interests of individuals on the periphery. E.E. Schattschneider identified
in a different era the tendency of the two parties to compete for sixty percent of the electorate that
voted while ignoring the forty percent on the periphery that did not. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE
SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 97–113 (1960).
16. FRYMER supra note 13, at 7–10 (describing the process of capture and providing an example of
Blacks overwhelmingly voting for the Democratic Party, which takes them for granted and instead
appeals to moderate-to-conservative white voters). Professor Terry Smith has described the racially
disparate impact of the median voter model:
The median voter model is inherently inconsistent with [a] view of race as a defining issue
because the median voter—who is white—is strongly skewed to one side of the political
continuum on the race question, while black voters are strongly skewed to the opposite
extreme. Moreover, even if the gap between black and white perspectives on issues of race is
overstated, the racial harm of the median voter theory lies as much in the common perception
among political leaders that the median voter does not support black interests as it does in
parties’ efforts to cater to the reality of the white median voter’s beliefs about race.
Terry Smith, Parties and Transformative Politics, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 845, 852 (2000). These racial
harms are analogous to the harms that inure to the poor when they are shut out of the process of party
coalition-building.
17. DOWNS, supra note 13, at 39 (explaining that when a voter perceives the difference between his
expected utility incomes from voting for one party as opposed to voting for another to be zero, he
abstains).
18. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 15, at 105.
19. In other words, the expected benefits from voting are exceeded by the costs. DOWNS, supra
note 13, at 39.
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voting.20 This “resource model of participation” thus attributed individual
decisions to participate to personal characteristics and the so-called costs of
voting in terms of time, money, and knowledge. This model, which was
consistent with the conventional account that lack of participation leads to lack
of responsiveness, attributed the nonparticipation of the poor to their lack of
resources as opposed to the lack of responsiveness by the parties and elected
officials.
This consensus in favor of the resource model of participation began to
break down because of the inability to account for the paradoxical trend that as
average Americans were becoming more educated over time their willingness
to vote had declined.21 Mobilization theorists found a solution to this paradox by
examining the benefits side of voting.22 They found that “people who see more
at stake in politics, whether because policies affect them more, identities beckon
them more, options appeal to them more, or duty calls them more, are more
attracted by the many benefits that politics offers.”23 Political parties play an
important role in creating these benefits to voting by mobilizing individuals and
groups—contacting voters and urging them to vote for a particular candidate on
the basis of shared interests—and it is the choice of political parties to focus
these mobilization efforts on middle- and upper-class individuals that has led
marginalized groups, like the poor, to abstain from voting.24
A more recent empirical study by some of the original proponents of the
resource model of participation provides further support for mobilization
theory.25 This study, which includes the previously omitted variable “political
interest” in its empirical model, found that it, not education or income, has the
most substantial impact on participation.26 Political interest is associated more
with the benefits side of voting and is primarily generated through the
mobilization efforts of political parties to attract voters. Thus, mobilization
theory supports the argument that it is the lack of responsiveness—through
public policy promulgated by legislators while in office and mobilization efforts
during campaign season—that results in lack of participation. The sources of

20. WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 12, at 24 (finding that education has the most
powerful independent effect on turnout); SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN
AMERICA 13 (1972) (finding that job, education, and income are determinants of political
participation).
21. Richard A. Brody, The Puzzle of Participation in America, in THE NEW AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 287 (Anthony King ed., 1978).
22. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 5 (1993) (“People participate in politics not so much because of who they
are but because of the political choices and incentives they are offered.”).
23. Id. at 6.
24. Id. at 213 (“[C]hanging patterns of mobilization by parties, campaigns, and social movements
account for at least half of the decline in electoral participation since the 1960s.”).
25. Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba, & Kay Lehman Schlozman, Beyond SES: A Resource Model of
Political Participation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 271 (1995).
26. Id. at 283.
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responsiveness bias therefore must be found elsewhere such as within the
incentives structures of the two-party system.
Vulnerable groups, such as Blacks27 and the poor,28 have historically been
most in danger of having their interests excluded from the political process as a
result of the defects within the incentive structure of the two-party system.29 A
history of discrimination and political marginalization has left these two groups
without representation in the political process at different periods of time.30
During the past forty years, however, the political fortunes of these two groups
have diverged dramatically. Blacks, particularly those who live in the South,
have emerged from a state of political exclusion to one of political inclusion.
Prior to 1970, the southern wing of the Democratic Party, which had historically
dominated southern politics, consistently ignored Blacks’ interests; today,
however, that same party is dependent on their support for election.31 At the
same time, the poor, who were once the putative beneficiaries of the
Democratic Party’s “war on poverty” in the 1960s, have become increasingly
politically invisible as Democrats seek the support of the middle class at the
expense of policies favorable to the poor. In addition, the Republican Party
during this period has shown little interest in incorporating the poor into its
electoral coalition.32 As a result, the poor are in a state of political exclusion not
unlike the position of southern Blacks before the 1970s: their interests and
needs are rarely considered in the political process. In response, the poor, for
the most part, abstain from voting.33 Like the political exclusion of southern

27. Blacks are obviously included among the poor. Although this overlap may present complexities
requiring a more granular analysis in a different context, it does not for present purposes. In this article,
we seek only to identify a constitutional floor for representation below which neither group may fall.
28. The poor are usually described as those living below the official federal poverty line. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
2006 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-233.pdf. As local efforts to raise the
poverty line upward demonstrate, this metric is underinclusive. DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV & PETER
GERMANIS, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND WELFARE REFORM ACADEMY, RECONSIDERING THE
FEDERAL POVERTY MEASURE (2004), available at http://www.welfareacademy.org/pubs/poverty/
povmeasure.description.pdf. Moreover, because the poor are not a static subset of the population—
families and individuals move in and out of poverty over time—the descriptor paints as aberrational
something that is much more common than widely appreciated. Mark R. Rank, Toward a New
Understanding of American Poverty, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 32–35 (2006). Finally, while
household incomes may lift families above poverty status, individual workers’ wages in the United
States are astonishingly low. David Cay Johnston, Joe the Plumber’s Taxes, 121 TAX NOTES 471 (2008)
(finding that more than half of all workers had an annual salary of less than $25,000 in 2007).
29. See infra III.
30. See infra III.
31. See infra III.
32. The Republican Party has appealed to voters in these groups on the basis of shared social
values, like abortion and gay marriage. See THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS?:
HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA 67–77 (2005). While this is an important step,
the unwillingness to appeal to interests distinct to these groups, such as civil rights and social welfare,
acts as a continued impediment to inclusiveness. See infra III.
33. In the 2004 presidential election, less than forty percent of the poor reported voting, the lowest
percentage of any income class. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE
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Blacks prior to the 1970s, the current political exclusion of the poor raises
important concerns about the representativeness of American democracy.
III
THE DIVERGENCE IN PARTY RESPONSIVENESS TO SOUTHERN BLACKS AND
THE POOR
During his 1964 State of the Union Address, President Lyndon Johnson
declared a “war on poverty.”34 As part of this war, the Democratic-controlled
Congress enacted legislation over the next four years that established socialwelfare programs targeting the structural sources of poverty including
inadequate jobs, health, and education, as well as programs targeting the
immediate needs of the poor. Addressing the structural sources of poverty,
Congress enacted the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964, which established
Community Action Programs that empowered the poor by incorporating them
into local committees responsible for designing and administering antipoverty
programs and services, such as job training.35 The next year, Congress passed the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which increased federal spending on
education and focused this spending on educationally disadvantaged children
living in impoverished areas.36 It also amended the Social Security Act to
establish Medicare, a federal health-insurance program for the elderly, and
Medicaid, a federal health-insurance program for the poor.37 In addition to this
legislation focused on addressing the structural sources of poverty, Congress
targeted the immediate needs of the poor by making permanent the Food
Stamp Program, which appropriated money to address the nutritional needs of
the poor, and by increasing the minimum wage to the highest real-value level in
its history.38

ELECTION OF 2004 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/
voting/cps2004.html.
34. In his address, President Johnson described the broad goals of the war on poverty:
The war on poverty is not a struggle simply to support people, to make them dependent on
the generosity of others. It is a struggle to give people a chance. It is an effort to allow them to
develop and use their capacities, as we have been allowed to use ours, so that they can share,
as others share, in the promise of this nation. . . . It strikes at the causes, not just the
consequences of poverty.
Bernard R. Gifford, War on Poverty: Assumptions, History, and Results, a Flawed but Important Effort,
in THE GREAT SOCIETY AND ITS LEGACY: TWENTY YEARS OF SOCIAL POLICY 60, 63 (Marshall
Kaplan & Peggy L. Cuciti eds., 1986).
35. SAR A. LEVITAN, THE GREAT SOCIETY’S POOR LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO POVERTY ix
(1969).
36. Patrick McGuinn & Frederick Hess, Freedom from Ignorance: Great Society and the Evolution
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, in THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF
LIBERALISM 289, 297–98 (F. Piven & R. Cloward eds., 2005).
37. Edward Berkowitz, Medicare, The Great Society’s Enduring National Health Insurance
Program, in THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF LIBERALISM 320, 320 (F. Piven & R.
Cloward eds., 2005).
38. BARTELS, supra note 5, at 226.
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Measuring responsiveness in terms of the crude measure of passage of major
legislation, the war on poverty represented an explosion in Democratic Party
responsiveness to the poor that had not been seen since the Great Depression.
This increased responsiveness was driven in part by moral considerations and
the influence of intellectuals such as Michael Harrington, whose book The
Other America: Poverty in the United States poignantly described the extent of
poverty and led to a parade of commentary on the issue.39 Political
considerations also played an important role. Presidents John F. Kennedy and
Johnson approached the antipoverty program with an eye towards maintaining
the poor, which comprised nearly twenty percent of the national population in
1964, as part of the Democratic Party’s electoral coalition that had prevailed
since the New Deal.40 This proved to be especially important in light of the
defection of many southern Whites from the Democratic Party as a result of the
national party’s promotion of a civil-rights agenda favorable to Blacks.41 In total,
the Democratic Party, with the exception of southern Democrats, who viewed
legislation like the Economic Opportunity Act as disproportionately benefiting
Blacks,42 overwhelmingly supported the “war on poverty” legislation, while the
Republican Party, consistent with its historical leaning since the New Deal
towards the more affluent classes, expressed lukewarm support for these
programs.43
In contrast to the national Democratic Party’s efforts to incorporate the
poor into its electoral coalition, the southern wing of the Democratic Party in
the one-party-dominated South continued to resist the growing influence of
Blacks that flowed from the dramatic increase in registration and voting
stimulated by the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965.44 Southern Democratic
candidates continued to seek the support of white voters who saw growing

39. Gifford, supra note 34, at 61.
40. See, e.g., JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 130 (2000) (describing President Kennedy’s efforts to keep poor voters in the
Democratic electoral coalition through the creation of antipoverty programs).
41. See Merle Black, The Transformation of the Southern Democratic Party, 66 J. POL. 1001, 1010
(2004) (describing the devastating combination of racial and economic liberalism required to maintain
southern white support). The efforts to maintain the New Deal Coalition ultimately proved
unsuccessful as racial animosity proved central to white southerners’ exodus. Kevin Phillips estimates
that the civil rights program probably accounted for between one third and one half of white
southerners’ flight to the Republican Party. KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY: THE PERILS
AND POLITICS OF RADICAL RELIGION, OIL, AND BORROWED MONEY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 180
(2006).
42. See LAWSON BOWLING, SHAPERS OF THE GREAT DEBATE ON THE GREAT SOCIETY 105
(2005).
43. JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974 538–40
(1996).
44. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 264 (2000) (noting that approximately a million new voters were
registered in the South within a few years after the Act was passed).
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black political power as a threat.45 On the basis of this support, three
segregationist governors were elected to office in the late 1960s.46 In addition, a
majority of southern Democratic congressmen catered to this constituency
when they voted against the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and the reauthorization
of the VRA in 1970.47 For those few white elected officials who were responsive
to the interests of black voters through their support for civil rights legislation,
such responsiveness often proved costly; for example, of the five Democratic
southern congressmen who voted in favor of the VRA in 1965, four lost their
seats in the 1966 election.48 Again, measuring responsiveness in terms of support
for major legislation, Blacks in the South remained an excluded political
minority through the early 1970s.
Over the next forty years, the position of Blacks evolved from that of a
politically excluded group to which most southern Democratic elected officials
proved unresponsive, to one in which the Democratic Party proved to be
greatly responsive. By 2000, Blacks comprised approximately forty percent of
Democratic voters in the South.49 Along with these advances in black political
participation came an increase in responsiveness to black interests by
Democratic Party elected officials.50 As an example of this increased
responsiveness, over ninety percent of southern Democratic members of
Congress supported the Voting Rights Amendment Act of 1982 and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991,51 while the Voting Rights Act of 2006 received unanimous
support. Although this increase in responsiveness by the Democratic Party has
been impressive, it is important not to overstate the political progress of Blacks
in the South.52 The exodus of many Whites from the Democratic Party has led to
the hegemony of a Republican Party in the South that fails to consider black
interests in much the same way that the Democratic Party had failed to forty
years earlier.
For the poor, the war on poverty in the 1960s and early 1970s evolved into a
war on the poor in the 1980s and 1990s. Conservative economic policies and
45. In the period after the passage of the VRA in 1965, the perceived threat of growing black
political power amongst white constituents and elected officials can be inferred from the fact that
representatives of political jurisdictions with high black populations were less responsive to the
interests of Blacks than elected officials in political jurisdictions with relatively low black populations.
See Charles Bullock & Susan A. MacManus, Policy Responsiveness to the Black Electorate:
Programmatic Versus Symbolic Representation, 9 AM. POL. Q. 357, 365 (1981); Merle Black, Racial
Composition of Congressional Districts and Support for Federal Voting Rights in the American South, 59
SOC. SCI. Q. 435, 443 (1978).
46. Black, supra note 45, at 444.
47. Id. at 443–44.
48. Id. at 444.
49. See Black, supra note 41, at 1011.
50. Id. at 1002 (describing the shift of the Democratic Party from “[t]he party of white supremacy”
to “the party of racial inclusion and ethnic diversity”).
51. WHITBY, supra note 1, at 32, 65.
52. It is also important to note that the comparisons between responsiveness to Blacks and the
poor are relative; the authors do not contend that the VRA or any other legal tool has adequately
remedied the problem of electoral capture as it applies to Blacks.
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political rhetoric combined with virtual abandonment by the Democratic Party
resulted in the poor being both economically more vulnerable and politically
more impotent. Republican Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan
eliminated many of the “war on poverty” programs and cut spending on
antipoverty measures.53 With the exception of an evolving state health-insurance
program for children living in poverty,54 there has been little in terms of
antipoverty legislation since the establishment of the relatively successful
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in 1972. Even the success of the EITC,
which provides tax credits to the working poor, has been offset by the declining
real value of the minimum wage.55 The decreased spending and lack of
legislation responsive to the interests and needs of the poor over the past forty
years has continued in spite of the fact that 12.5 % of Americans continue to
live below the poverty line, 56 a measure that some argue understates the current
levels of poverty.57 This is exactly the same percentage that lived below the
poverty line in 197158 when American support for the war on poverty began to
wane.
The success of the conservative strategy of racialization and personalization
of poverty contributed importantly to the political marginalization of the poor.
Conservatives employed stories about “welfare queens,” who were described as
“black wom[e]n with a long-term addiction to the dole and a willingness to use
childbirth as a way to prolong and increase [their] welfare check[s].”59 Many
Americans were influenced by this type of rhetoric and adopted stereotypes of
the poor as black (even though most were not), undeserving, and lacking in
morals, values, and work ethic.60 This shift from a view of poverty as driven by
structural defects in the economic system to poverty as driven by race and
personal defects in the individual also led many Americans to believe that
government had a limited role in alleviating the problem.61

53. See Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, The Politics of the Great Society, in THE GREAT
SOCIETY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF LIBERALISM 253, 264–65 (Sidney Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur eds.,
2005).
54. For a description of state health-insurance programs for low-income children, see JOEL
HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 122–
28 (2007).
55. BARTELS, supra note 5, at 246.
56. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY STATUS OF PEOPLE BY FAMILY RELATIONSHIP, RACE, AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1959 TO 2007 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/
histpov/perindex.html.
57. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 54, at 23.
58. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 56.
59. Joe Soss et al., Setting the Terms of Relief: Explaining State Policy Choices in the Devolution
Revolution, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 378, 390 (2001).
60. See William JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 13–18 (1987) (describing the growing influence of this conservative
perspective in the 1980s).
61. Id. at 6–18 (describing and assessing the effects of the shifting views of poverty and the poor).
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As a result of this shift, the Democratic Party has over the last twenty years
largely abandoned the poor as part of its effort to bring middle-class whites, the
median-swing voters in recent elections, back into its electoral coalition. This
abandonment was best symbolized by President Bill Clinton’s support for the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 that
garnered about half the votes of congressional Democrats.62 This Act
transferred responsibility over welfare programs to the states and imposed stiff
new work requirements without addressing the structural deficiencies in the
low-wage labor market or the inadequate education and job training of the
poor. The Act also limited lifetime eligibility for the receipt of aid to five years.63
By 2004, promises of programs and legislation appealing to the interests of
the middle class dominated the Democratic Party platform, and the only
measures directed to the poor were support for an increase in the minimum
wage and the EITC. These policies, which were low on the Democratic agenda,
merely serve as Band-Aids to the problems of poverty.64 In 2008, Senator
Barack Obama’s presidential campaign focused on putting America’s “middle
class first.”65 The poor seemed to be a distant second for Obama,66 who along
with Republican opponent Senator John McCain, rarely addressed their
interests on the campaign trail and proposed few new policies that would
specifically target the poor.67 Consequently, from the perspective of policy
responsiveness in the form of favorable legislation, the poor seemed to have
become politically invisible. The Democratic Party has recently paid very little

62. In the Senate, seventeen Democrats voted in favor of the Act, thirteen opposed; in the House,
seventy voted in favor of the Act and seventy-seven opposed. All but two Republicans in Congress,
both in the House, supported the bill.
63. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 54, at 1.
64. Strong at Home, Respected in the World, The 2004 Democratic National Platform for America
(July 27, 2004), available at www.democrats.org/pdfs/2004platform.pdf.
65. See, e.g., Senator Barack Obama, Prepared Remarks for Obama’s Event in Dover, New
Hampshire, THE PAGE, Sept. 12, 2008, available at http://thepage.time.com/prepared-remarks-forobamas-event-in-dover-new-hampshire/ (describing how if he were elected he would be a President
that put the “middle class first” and outlining a set of campaign promises directed towards this group of
people).
66. The importance of the middle class was further demonstrated by the Obama Administration’s
establishment of a middle-class task force led by Vice President-elect Joseph Biden and including four
prospective cabinet members as well as presidential advisers. Biden to Run Middle Class Task Force,
NEWS,
Dec.
21,
2008,
available
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/21/
CBS
politics/main4680733.shtml (last visited July 7, 2009). The task force is designed to “ensure the middle
class is ‘no longer being left behind.’” Id.
67. Although the 2008 Democratic Party platform described poverty as a “national priority,” the
only specific policies proposed were those that have essentially become boilerplate components of prior
Democratic platforms, including expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, raising the minimum
wage, and indexing it to inflation. See Renewing America’s Promise, The 2008 Democratic National
Platform available at http://www.democrats.org/a/party/platform.html. The only two discussions of the
poor and poverty in the Republican Party platform involved poverty abroad and poverty associated
with
single-parent
families.
See
2008
Republican
Platform
available
at
http://
platform.gop.com/2008Platform.pdf. No specific policies were proposed to address the economic needs
and interests of the domestic poor. Id.
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attention to the interests and needs of the poor and the Republican Party has
done little to fill the responsiveness deficit.
The account of divergence in the inclusion of southern Blacks into the
political process through increasing Democratic party responsiveness and the
exclusion of the poor from the political process through increasing Democratic
Party neglect over the past forty years is supported by empirical studies drawn
from the social sciences. A study of responsiveness prior to, and immediately
after, the enactment of the VRA showed somewhat paradoxically that the more
Blacks there were in a particular district, the less likely that white Democratic
elected official representing that district would support legislation favorable to
Blacks.68 By the mid-1970s, this inverse relationship had been replaced by a
positive relationship between the proportion of Blacks in a district and the
responsiveness of political actors to black interests.69 The VRA, which not only
increased voting by southern Blacks but also led to the creation of districts in
which Blacks constituted a majority, has been an important source of increased
responsiveness by southern Democrats as a whole.70 By the mid-1980s, southern
Democrats were just as liberal as nonsouthern Democrats in their voting
pattern on civil rights issues; the responsiveness bias favoring southern Whites
over Blacks had virtually disappeared.71
For the poor, the account of interest group exclusion based on the lack of
favorable legislation and policies over the past forty years also finds support in
the empirical studies. The one study to examine responsiveness bias in the 1970s

68. See Black, supra note 45, at 443 (describing this inverse relationship in the roll-call votes of
members of Congress for the Voting Rights Act in 1965). This pattern of roll-call voting is consistent
with what V. O. Key famously described as the threat hypothesis, which claims that the more Blacks
there are in a district, the more whites perceive a threat to their hegemony and the greater their
hostility to Blacks. V. O. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 5–10 (1949).
69. Early studies showed a curvilinear relationship between the proportion of Blacks in a district
and responsiveness of elected officials; responsiveness increased linearly up to a point at which Blacks
comprised approximately twenty-five percent of the electorate, decreased up to a point at which Blacks
made up thirty-five percent of the electorate, and then again increased linearly. Black, supra note 45, at
445; Charles S. Bullock, Congressional Voting and the Mobilization of a Black Electorate in the South,
43 J. POL. 662, 670 (1981). A subsequent study found that the differences in responsiveness and
increased conservatism of districts with approximately thirty-percent black population had to do with
the rural character of these districts. Michael W. Combs et al., Black Constituents and Congressional
Roll Call Votes, 37 W. POL. Q. 424, 430 (1984). Later empirical studies introduced an interaction blackurban variable into their regressions and found a linear relationship in urban districts between the
proportion of Blacks and responsiveness. Kenny Whitby, Measuring Congressional Responsiveness to
the Policy Interests of Black Constituents, 68 SOC. SCI. Q. 367, 374 (1987). The most recent empirical
studies have shown a linear relationship without the introduction of this interactive term. Mary
Herring, Legislative Responsiveness to Black Constituents in Three Deep South States, 52 J. POL. 740,
752 (1990); Vincent L. Hutchings, Issue Salience and Support for Civil Rights Legislation Among
Southern Democrats, 23 LEG. STUD. Q. 521, 522 (1998).
70. See Charles S. Bullock, The Impact of Changing the Racial Composition of Congressional
Districts on Legislators’ Roll Call Behavior, 23 AMER. POL. SCI. Q. 141, 148 (1995) (demonstrating that
aggressive drawing of majority-black districts in the 1990 round of redistricting increased
responsiveness).
71. Kenny J. Whitby & Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., A Longitudinal Analysis of Competing
Explanations for the Transformation of Southern Congressional Politics, 53 J. POL. 504, 510 (1991).
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found that “the vast majority of cities exhibit[ed] higher levels of responsiveness
to high-income citizens and whites than to low-income citizens and blacks.”72
Thus, early evidence indicated the ephemeral nature of the increased
responsiveness of elected officials during the war on poverty.73 A more recent
study examined public opinion polls on major changes in U.S. policy from 1981
to 2002. It found that on issues in which the rich and the poor disagree, the
policy outcomes were strongly related to the preferences of the rich and
“wholly unrelated to the preferences of the poor.”74 In a similarly troubling
study, Larry Bartels examined the voting patterns and specific roll-call votes of
U.S. senators in the late 1980s and early 1990s and found that on bills involving
minimum wage, civil rights, government spending, and abortion, “the views of
low-income constituents had no discernible impact on the voting behavior of
their senators.”75 The consistency with which the preferences of the poor were
not adhered to by the senators strongly supports an inference that their
interests were not even incorporated into the interest-bargaining and
compromises of the political process. As further support for this inference,
Bartels found that the poor were not only politically irrelevant to Republican
senators, but also to Democratic senators, who were found to have paid no
attention to the views of the poor.76 The poor, at least according to these
empirical studies, have essentially become an excluded group in the political
process.
Both accounts of the sources of lack of responsiveness to marginalized
group interests—lack of participation and defects in the political process—
provide plausible explanations for this divergence in responsiveness between
southern Blacks and the poor that are not mutually exclusive. According to the
conventional account that attributes lack of responsiveness to lack of
participation, political officials have become responsive to southern Blacks
because they vote and unresponsive to the poor because they do not.77 The data
provide some support for this view. Specifically, the proportion of individuals
below the poverty line that reported voting in presidential elections has
declined from above fifty percent in 1964 to less than forty percent in 2004,
while the proportion of Blacks that reported voting has remained relatively
stable at just below sixty percent since the 1968 presidential election.78
72. Paul D. Schumaker & Russell W. Getter, Responsiveness Bias in 51 American Communities, 21
AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 257 (1977).
73. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 53, at 266 (“[O]nce the extraordinary political conditions
that had spurred the Great Society programs receded, the political influence temporarily exercised by
the minority poor in American politics evaporated.”).
74. Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 POL. SCI. Q. 778, 788 (2005).
75. BARTELS, supra note 5, at 253–54.
76. Id. at 254.
77. See supra text and accompanying notes 11 and 12.
78. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2004,
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting/cps2004.html; U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, VOTER PARTICIPATION IN THE NATIONAL ELECTION: NOVEMBER 1964, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting/p20-143.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2008). These
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However, the alternative account—that lack of responsiveness is caused by
particular defects in the two-party system that create incentives to exclude
particular groups—can also explain the stable participation of southern Blacks
and the decline in turnout amongst the poor over the past forty years.79
Specifically, the data provide support for the view that changes to democratic
organizational structures mandated by the Constitution, and later the VRA,
created incentives for political parties to be responsive to southern Blacks.80
These changes included the invalidation of certain multimember districts under
the Equal Protection Clause and the mandated creation of majority-minority
districts under the VRA.81 At the same time, no such changes in organizational
structures have been specifically targeted towards creating incentives for
responsiveness to the interests of the poor.
It is difficult to disentangle the effect of each of these sources on the
increase in party responsiveness to southern Blacks and the decline in
responsiveness to the poor. Nonetheless it seems relatively uncontroversial to
assume that the divergence in responsiveness to these two groups are driven by
both the changes in participation rates of these groups and defects in the
incentive structures of the two-party system. To the extent that political parties’
lack of responsiveness is caused by defects in the political process, such
nonresponsiveness raises issues of a constitutional dimension. In particular, the
Court has established a much overlooked standard under the Equal Protection
Clause to ensure representative government through “minimum
responsiveness” by political parties to groups with shared interests.
This constitutional protection is especially important for a marginalized
group like the poor because of the lack of a foreseeable social movement that
will contribute to shifts in national politics analogous to the civil rights
movement of the 1950s and 1960s and the changes it brought to southern
politics for Blacks. In addition, it is unlikely that the political parties will
voluntarily change, through legislation, the organizational structures of the twoparty system in a manner responsive to the poor. Such responsive legislation to
the poor presupposes a level of responsiveness that is nonexistent.

numbers exceed the percentage of persons that actually voted, but there is no evidence that
misreporting has varied over time. See, e.g., Lee Sigelman, The Nonvoting Voter in Voting Research, 26
J. POL. 47, 54–55 (1981).
79. Studies have generally shown that particular districting arrangements, such as majorityminority districts in which a particular minority racial group constitutes a majority of voters, has led to
an increase in responsiveness by political officials and greater participation by Blacks and Latinos in
those districts as compared to non-majority–minority districts. See e.g., CLAUDINE GAY, THE EFFECT
OF MINORITY DISTRICTS AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN
CALIFORNIA 55–57 (2001); Matt A. Barreto et al., The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts
on Latino Turnout, 98 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 65, 74 (2004); but see Kimball Brace et al., Minority
Turnout and the Creation of Majority-Minority Districts, 23 AM. POL. Q. 190, 201 (1995) (finding that
the creation of majority–minority districts “does not invariably lead to greater participation”).
80. See supra note 79.
81. See infra IV.
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IV
THE MINIMUM RESPONSIVENESS STANDARD
Chief Justice Earl Warren once described the legislative-reapportionment
cases as his most important contribution to the law.82 That is rather remarkable
considering that he was the author of Brown v. Board of Education,83 which
declared school segregation unconstitutional, and that he was an important
contributor to the criminal-procedure revolution that established an array of
constitutional protections for criminal defendants.84 Of course, when assessing
the effect of the reapportionment cases on the redistricting practices of every
state in the Union, Chief Justice Warren’s description seems not only more
defensible but understated.
What has been overlooked by many scholars is that these cases stand for
more than the requirement that states maintain equal-population legislative
districts; the cases established as well a constitutional principle of fair
representation premised on majority rule. This principle would later
incorporate a requirement of minimum responsiveness to politically
marginalized groups. In light of the states’ consistent compliance with the
equal-population principle over the last two redistricting cycles, this latter,
minimum responsiveness requirement is the more relevant constitutional
concern given the prevalence of politically marginalized groups like southern
Blacks and the poor.
The “reapportionment revolution” began in 1962 when the Supreme Court
entered what had previously been described as the “political thicket.”85 In the
absence of constitutional constraints, states maintained malapportioned districts
to protect incumbents and empower minority voters, particularly rural voters.86
Generally, states would either draw districts in accordance with county lines or
maintain systems of voting that gave geographical units equal voting power
irrespective of differences in population.87 The growing movement of people to
urban centers over the course of the twentieth century increased the differences
in population between counties and led to vastly unequal weighting of urban
and rural votes in many states.88 In light of the examples of gross
malapportionment of districts, the Court in Baker v. Carr89 held that the
82. MICHAL R. BELKNAP, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, 1953–1969 109 (2005).
83. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
84. For a description of the most important criminal-procedure cases of the Warren Court era, see
YALE KASIMAR, THE WARREN COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE WARREN COURT, A
RETROSPECTIVE 116–58 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996).
85. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 555 (1946). It could be argued that the Supreme Court
had already entered the political thicket two years earlier in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960), in which it held a redistricting arrangement that disenfranchised Blacks in Tuskegee, Alabama,
unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment.
86. Auerbach, supra note 9, at 68–70.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause established a constitutional
constraint on the establishment and maintenance of these districts. Over the
next three terms the Court would identify the constraint and its theoretical
basis.
In Gray v. Sanders, the Court, addressing a party primary voting system,
held that the Equal Protection Clause required one person, one vote.90 In other
words, all individuals regardless of race, sex, occupation, income, residence or
any other characteristic must have an equally weighted vote;91 therefore, all
geographical voting units had to be comprised of an equal number of
individuals. The Court would later apply this one person, one vote standard to
federal congressional districts under Article I, § 2 of the Constitution.92 In these
early cases, the Court grounded the one person, one vote standard on the idea
of participatory equality and the theory derived from prior case law that the
right to vote is preservative of all other rights.93 Much as the denial of the right
to vote makes the exercise of other rights illusory, the Court determined that
the unequal weighting of votes through malapportioned districts would abridge
the right to vote and concomitantly impair other rights.94
The Court further developed the theoretical justification for one person,
one vote in Reynolds v. Sims, in which it held malapportioned state legislative
districts unconstitutional because they undermined representative government
by “sanction[ing] minority control of state legislative bodies” and impeding
government responsiveness to “the popular will.”95 Representative government,
the Court insisted, required majority rule and responsiveness to the majority of
the electorate.96 Fair representation in accordance with majority rule therefore
required the “opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of
state legislators.”97 As for minority groups, such as rural voters, that states
sought to protect through malapportioned districts, the Court explained that
“[o]ur constitutional system amply provides for the protection of minorities by
means other than giving them majority control of state legislatures.”98
Justice Potter Stewart, unsatisfied with the Court’s association of
representative government with majority rule, dissented and provided an
alternative theory of representative government. For Justice Stewart,

90. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
91. Id. at 379.
92. Specifically in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964), the Court explained that the phrase
“by the People of the several States” as stated in Art. I, § 2, required that “one man’s vote in a
congressional election [be] worth as much as another’s.”
93. Id. at 17. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (explaining that voting is
regarded as “a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights”).
94. Id. at 17–18.
95. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
96. Id. (“In a society grounded on representative government, it would seem reasonable that a
majority of the people of a State could elect a majority of that State’s legislators.”).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 566.
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representative government involved “a process of accommodating group
interests through democratic institutional arrangements.”99 The function of
government, therefore, is “to channel the numerous opinions, interests, and
abilities of the people of a State into the making of the State’s public policy.”100
In accordance with this theory, legislative apportionment should not be focused
on ensuring equally populous legislative districts, but rather on safeguarding
“effective representation in the State’s legislature, in cooperation with other
organs of political power, of the various groups and interests making up the
electorate.”101 Fair representation, therefore, meant responsiveness in the form
of fair consideration of the views of the “medley of component voices”
representing the many diverse interests that make up society.102
Although initially expressed only in dissent, Justice Stewart’s notion of
representative government would soon be incorporated, in limited form, into
the Court’s fair representation principle. In the often overlooked case of
Fortson v. Dorsey,103 decided a year after Reynolds, voters challenged
multimember districts as contrary to one person, one vote. Multimember
districts are districts in which constituents elect multiple representatives to a
legislative body. In order to be consistent with one person, one vote,
multimember districts must be proportionally larger in terms of population than
a single-member district. In other words, a multimember district in which
constituents elect two representatives must be twice as large in terms of
population as a single-member district. The multimember districts in Fortson
met the proportionality requirement;104 nonetheless, voters challenged the
district because it had the potential, because of its size, to nullify the
preferences of a minority group of voters.105
According to the fair-representation-as-majority-rule principle espoused in
Reynolds, the fact that a districting arrangement nullified the preferences of a
minority subset of voters would seem irrelevant since there are ostensibly other
constitutional means of protecting minorities. Nonetheless, instead of simply
denying the claim, the Court announced in dicta that, while it had not been

99. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 749 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 751. Other commentators writing at the time were also critical of the Reynolds majority
narrow notion of fair representation as majority rule as opposed to fair representation as the inclusion
of all interests in the political process. See Auerbach, supra note 9, at 51; Phil C. Neal, Baker v. Carr:
Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 252, 277. Reynolds, however, was equivocal in its
invocation of majority rule as the underlying rationale for one-person, one-vote. The Court was
concerned that Alabama’s malapportionment “den[ied] majority rights in a way that far surpasses any
possible denial of minority rights that might otherwise be thought to result.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565.
Thus, majority rule did not appear to be the Court’s sole measure of “fair and effective” representation.
Rather, Alabama had overweighted minority interests in a manner that was not “relevant to the
permissible purposes of legislative apportionment.” Id.
103. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
104. Id. at 437.
105. Id.
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proven in the case, “[i]t might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multimember constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a
particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of
racial or political elements of the voting population.”106 The next year, the Court
would intimate in another case that apportionment schemes other than
multimember districts could also operate to have this effect.107
Despite the establishment of a standard that seemed to open the door for
some limited requirement of group-based responsiveness, the meaning of this
ambiguous standard would not be made clear for another eight years. Part of
the confusion with the new standard and why it would lie dormant had to do
with the missing component in the Court’s development of the fair
representation principle—political parties.108 The individualist, fairrepresentation principle based on majority rule that was developed in Reynolds
seems to imagine a democracy comprised of atomistic parts that vote in a
manner that produces a majority that must be respected and a minority that is
irrelevant. The more group-based, fair representation principle described by
Justice Stewart, on the other hand, seemed to imagine a representative
government comprised of an infinite number of interest groups that must be
accommodated directly in the governing apparatus. Both of these models of
representative government are undertheorized because they omit political
parties, which are instrumental to ensuring responsiveness both to the majority
and to the varied group interests that comprise society, but which also have the
capacity to exclude groups from the political process.
In two cases decided in the early 1970s, the Court established a minimum
responsiveness standard reliant on the ambiguous dicta in Fortson that
incorporated a pivotal role for political parties. The standard formulated was
one of minimum responsiveness because it did not require that governments
enact public policy favorable to particular group interests or that groups be
guaranteed the election of candidates responsive to their interests. It merely
required that groups have their interests considered by one or both of the
parties so as to ensure that they are part of the bargaining and compromise of
the political process.109
In Whitcomb v. Chavis,110 residents of a ghetto area in Marion County,
Indiana, complained that the multimember districting arrangement diluted their
voting strength. The residents described themselves as a group of poor, black

106. Id. at 439.
107. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966).
108. See William P. Irwin, Representation and Election: The Reapportionment Cases in Retrospect, 67
MICH. L. REV. 730, 737 (1969) (criticizing the failure of the Court to acknowledge the existence of
political parties in its development of a theory of representation).
109. The central role of political parties is now expressly acknowledged in the Court’s most recent
law of democracy decisions. See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (recognizing as an
important state interest the preservation of political parties as “viable and identifiable interest
groups”).
110. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
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individuals that have distinctive interests in “urban renewal and rehabilitation,
health care, employment training and opportunities, welfare and relief of the
poor, law enforcement, quality of education, and antidiscrimination measures”
that were underrepresented in the political process.111 As evidence of the
underrepresentation of their interests, they cited the fact that disproportionately few of the legislators elected from 1960 to 1968 had been
residents of the ghetto.112
The Court rejected this proxy for responsiveness and held that the ghetto
residents had been fairly represented in the political process on the basis of
three factors. First, the political process was open because poor Blacks were
able “to register or vote, to choose the political party they desired to support, to
participate in its affairs or to be equally represented on those occasions when
legislative candidates were chosen.”113 Second, there was no evidence that the
political parties were unresponsive to this particular group, noting that the
ghetto residents had failed to produce evidence demonstrating “that inhabitants
of the ghetto were regularly excluded from the slates of both parties, thus
denying them the chance of occupying legislative seats.”114 Finally, the Court
relied on historical contextual factors. It inferred, probably on the basis of its
support for the war on poverty during the 1960s, that the Democratic Party was
responsive to the interests of ghetto residents.115 The Court therefore
determined that the ghetto residents would not have any “justifiable complaints
about representation” if Democrats, as opposed to Republicans, had won four
of the five elections from 1960 to 1968.116 It concluded that the “canceling out”
of voting strength that the ghetto residents complained about was not based on
a “built-in bias against poor Negroes” but instead seemed to be “a mere
euphemism for political defeat at the polls.”117
In the second case, White v. Regester,118 the Court for the first time found a
constitutional violation of the minimum responsiveness standard. In this case,
members of the black community in Dallas County, Texas, challenged the
multimember districting scheme as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
As in Whitcomb, the Court focused on the openness and responsiveness of the
party system. This time, it found that the party system excluded Blacks and
their interests from the political process and invalidated the districting
arrangement. Looking to nearly identical factors as it did in Whitcomb, the
Court in White first cited the district court’s findings that members of the black
community were not able to participate in the Democratic Party’s affairs,

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
Id.
Id. at 151.
412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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concluding that they had been “effectively excluded from participation in the
Democratic Party primary selection process.”119 In addition, the evidence that
only two Blacks had been slated since Reconstruction by the Dallas Committee
for Responsible Government (DCRG), a White-dominated organization that
controlled the Democratic Party’s slating process, demonstrated to the Court
that Blacks were not equally represented on those occasions in which
candidates were chosen.120
Second, the Court relied on evidence that the Democratic Party was
unresponsive to black interests because the party “did not need the support of
the Negro community to win elections in the county and it did not therefore
exhibit good-faith concern for the political and other needs and aspirations of
the Negro community.”121 Finally, it looked to historical context and the use by
the DCRG of racist campaign tactics to defeat the black communities’
candidates of choice in previous elections.122 The Court concluded on the basis
of this evidence that Blacks in Dallas County had “less opportunity than did
other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice.”123
As shown by Whitcomb and White, the Court in its development of a
minimum responsiveness standard focused on three factors: the openness of the
parties to the membership of the particular group, the openness of the parties to
putting forward candidates responsive to the group, and the prior
responsiveness of at least one of the political parties to the group’s interests.124
The constitutional requirement of minimum responsiveness did not mandate
that the group’s party or candidate win a certain number of seats in elections.125
In fact, the Court first explained in Whitcomb that there was no requirement
that the group’s party or candidate of choice win any election;126 it then
reiterated in White that it is not enough that a group “has not had legislative
seats in proportion to its voting potential.”127 The minimum responsiveness
standard required only that members of minority groups have an opportunity to
participate and elect a legislator of their choice, with a key determinant being
that at least one of the parties be responsive to the group’s interests.
Congress ultimately expanded the minimum responsiveness standard
through its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in its
reauthorization of the VRA in 1982. Adopting the language of White, Congress
amended Section 2 of the VRA to prohibit election laws that result in

119.
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Id. at 767.
Id. at 766.
Id. at 767.
Id.
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149–52.
See id. at 153.
Id.
White, 412 U.S. at 765.
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discrimination on account of race, which can be proven by showing that “the
political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of [racial or
language minority groups] in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.”128 The Section 2 standard would also be used to
determine whether changes in election laws by southern jurisdictions would be
approved by the Attorney General of the United States under Section 5 of the
Act.129
The application of the minimum responsiveness standard through the
vehicle of the VRA has assured not only minimum responsiveness in southern
jurisdictions that have historically excluded racial minorities from the political
process, but also nearly proportionate representation in the U.S. House of
Representatives and several state legislatures in southern jurisdictions through
the Department of Justice’s aggressive enforcement of the Act.130 The minimumresponsive standard as established in the Act has thus emerged as another
important part of the story of increasing responsiveness by the southern
Democratic Party to black interests.131
In spite of the focus of the minimum responsiveness standard on ensuring
representative government, many scholars view the standard as merely part of
Equal Protection antidiscrimination doctrine.132 Consistent with this doctrine,
only districting arrangements that harm suspect classes, including racial and
ethnic minorities, are entitled to the level of scrutiny that would generally
invalidate practices that exclude groups from the political process. Since the
poor are not a suspect class,133 the standard would seem to offer limited
protection for members of this group. But an examination of the evolution of
the minimum responsiveness standard reveals that it is not about ensuring that
officials do not discriminate against members of a particular group, but instead
about addressing defects in representative government.

128. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (a)–(b) (West 2009).
129. MAURICE T. CUNNINGHAM, MAXIMIZATION, WHATEVER THE COST: RACE, REDISTRICTING,
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 5, 71–73 (2001) (describing the Department of Justice’s
incorporation of the § 2 results test into the § 5 preclearance process).
130. Id. at 3–5.
131. The only real questions concerning the VRA’s establishment of a minimum responsiveness
standard have to do with the contours of that standard, not its existence. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, No
Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1502–03 (1991) (proposing to
remedy systematic diminution of a minority representative’s influence on the legislative process by,
inter alia, requiring supermajority votes on issues of importance).
132. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 6, at 43–44. Most scholars treat Whitcomb as being simply about
race, see, e.g., Heather Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663,
1673 (2001), when in fact it is a complex case involving the interaction of race and class. For example,
the Court excluded middle-class Blacks from the class of plaintiffs finding that they did not share
interests with the poorer Blacks of the ghetto. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 131 (describing the decision of the
lower court to exclude middle-class Blacks from the class).
133. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1973).
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As Justice Stewart explained in the vote dilution case, City of Mobile v.
Bolden, “the focus in [these] cases has been on the lack of representation [that]
multimember districts afford various elements of the voting population in a
system of representative legislative democracy.”134 Concurring in judgment in
the same case, Justice Stevens reasoned that “there is no national interest in
creating an incentive to define political groups by racial characteristics. But if
the Constitution were interpreted to give more favorable treatment to a racial
minority alleging an unconstitutional impairment of its political strength than it
gives to other identifiable groups making the same claim, such an incentive
would inevitably result.”135
Though sometimes couching vote dilution claims in the language of
discrimination, the Court has not distinguished between groups such that those
considered suspect classes, like racial minorities, are deemed entitled to more
protection than other groups; instead, it has identified in the minimum
responsiveness standard a requirement to protect racial, ethnic, economic, and
political groups equally by ensuring inclusion through an opportunity to
participate in the political process and elect a candidate of choice.136 In fact, in
the most recent case in which the Court addressed a constitutional vote dilution
claim, Davis v. Bandemer, it described a minimum responsiveness standard
focused more on ensuring an open democratic process than on finding
discriminatory conduct.137 Specifically, Justice White, writing for a plurality,
explained that “[t]he question is whether a particular group has been
unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political
process” as measured by “the opportunity of members of the group to
participate in party deliberations in the slating and nomination of candidates,
their opportunity to register and vote, and hence their chance to directly
influence the election returns and to secure the attention of the winning
134. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1979).
135. See id. at 90 (Stevens, J., concurring).
136. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748 (1983)
(Stevens J., concurring); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 111, 130–31 (1986).
137. Davis, 478 U.S. at 130–33. There have been other more recent constitutional challenges to
districting, but those have been directed to the process of drawing the districts as opposed to the effect
of the districting arrangement on the dilution of the voting strength of a particular minority group. See
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 416–17 (2006) (addressing
a Constitution-based claim that “[a] decision . . . to effect mid-decennial redistricting, when solely
motivated by partisan objectives, violates equal protection . . . because it serves no legitimate public
purpose and burdens one group because of its political opinions and affiliation”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267, 272–73 (2004) (addressing a Constitution-based complaint that the districts created by the
legislative act “were ‘meandering and irregular,’ and ‘ignor[ed] all traditional districting criteria,
including the preservation of local government boundaries, solely for the sake of partisan advantage”)
(citing Juris. Statement 136a, ¶ 22, 135a, ¶ 20); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993) (addressing a
Fourteenth Amendment allegation that “the deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on
the basis of race violated their constitutional right to participate in a ‘color-blind’ electoral process,”
while specifically recognizing that “appellants did not claim that the . . . reapportionment plan
unconstitutionally ‘diluted’ white voting strength”). However, more recent cases such as Vieth and
LULAC have addressed statutory-based vote dilution claims under the VRA. The evolution of the
statutory standard is beyond the scope of this paper.
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candidate.”138 As a law-of-democracy doctrine, the minimum responsiveness
standard is therefore obviously much more protective of groups, particularly
those ordinarily excluded from constitutional recognition, than the
antidiscrimination doctrine.
V
CONCLUSION
The constitutional minimum responsiveness standard has created
opportunities for the inclusion of groups, such as southern Blacks, who had
been historically excluded from the political process. To the extent that
empirical studies show that neither the Democratic nor the Republican Party
take into account the interests of the poor when governing, the minimum
responsiveness standard is directly applicable; however, any challenge to
districting arrangements requires a localized appraisal of party openness and
responsiveness.139 Specifically, such challenge would require an assessment of
the openness of the party process to the participation of the poor in terms of
party membership, putting forward candidates responsive to the poor, and the
history of the local party’s responsiveness to the interests of the poor.
In addition, an assessment of the applicability of the minimum
responsiveness standard requires an examination of the extent to which the
poor have shared interests. It has been assumed throughout this article that the
poor, because of their shared economic status, have shared interest; however,
the applicability of the standard depends on proof of this assumption.
But assuming that districting arrangements result in the exclusion of the
poor and their interests from the political process, it is necessary to identify the
proper mechanisms for ensuring a more inclusive and responsive party system
and government. The solution applied to southern Blacks under the VRA has
been mandating the establishment and maintenance of majority–minority
districts that ensure that this minority group has the opportunity to participate
in the political process and elect candidates responsive to its interests. This
structural approach seeks to change the electoral incentives of party actors by
shifting black voters from the periphery to the median in certain districts.140
Evidence seems to show that this approach has been successful; party
candidates in these districts have had no choice but to appeal to, and be
responsive to, the interests of black constituents in order to win elections.

138. Davis, 478 U.S. at 132–33. Although writing on behalf of a plurality of four, Justice Powell and
Stevens, who concurred in part and dissented in part agreed that the Equal Protection Clause protected
political groups. Id. at 161.
139. See supra III.
140. FRYMER, supra note 13, at 21 (describing the importance of changing electoral incentive
structures to put parties “in a position to establish themselves as democratizing agents”); Heather K.
Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C.
L. Rev. 1411, 1417 (2002) (arguing for the need for a structural approach to address group voting
harms).
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However, we should be cautious about applying a remedy that seems successful
for southern Blacks to the poor prior to addressing the viability of such an
approach for the poor. For now, it is enough to identify the problem of the
excluded poor and to identify a potential constitutional solution. As long as the
poor remain excluded, our government will not be truly representative and the
ideal of Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny will remain unfulfilled.

